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Over the past few years, the State of California has endured some
of the worst fire seasons on record. In 2020, over one million acres
burned across the San Francisco Bay Area, Northern California, and
the Central San Joaquin Valley—conditions which created a public
safety and health emergency in the midst of an ongoing pandemic. In
2019, the Kincade Fire set ablaze nearly 78,000 acres in Northern
California, but coincided with widespread power shutoffs impacting
millions of customers throughout the state. In 2018, we learned of the
devastation in Butte County, where the Camp Fire destroyed the
community of Paradise, California, and claimed the lives of eighty-six
people. To confront wildfire threats of such magnitude, the three largest
energy providers in California—Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern
California Edison, and San Diego Gas & Electric—have executed
Public Safety Power Shutoffs (de-energization) as one response to
mitigate public safety concerns. The California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) oversees all utilities operating within the state.
The CPUC authorizes PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, and all other intrastate
utilities to de-energize their power lines, but only as a measure of last
resort when dangerous fire conditions present an imminent threat to
public safety.
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While de-energization serves as a useful tool, it equally carries the
potential for abuse. PG&E stands as a notable example. The CPUC
evaluates de-energization execution for reasonableness but does not
inquire into other critical areas of relevant information: the condition of
electrical infrastructure, utility infrastructure repairs or investments
performed, or the financial status of the de-energizing utility. To ensure
utilities remain committed to their regulatory duties of promoting public
safety by delivering safe and reliable power to the public, this Note
recommends the CPUC incorporate an infrastructure investment inquiry
into its de-energization reasonableness review. As our electrical grid
deteriorates, environmental conditions worsen, and PG&E (the largest
of the three utility providers in California) emerges from bankruptcy, the
danger of de-energization becoming a general utility wildfire response
continues to increase. Without closer utility infrastructure scrutiny
public safety stands at risk—and at the whim of utility discretion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E),
Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric
(SDG&E) executed a series of widespread Public Safety Power Shutoffs
(PSPS)—also known as de-energization—across the State of
California.1 In doing so, PG&E cut power to nearly two million
customers within its service territory extending throughout the San
Francisco Bay Area, Northern California, and the Central San Joaquin
Valley; SCE to over 180,000 customers in Southern California; and
SDG&E to nearly 30,000 of its customers.2 The shutoffs garnered
criticism from the public and state officials, but within two weeks,
PG&E warned of another large de-energization event.3 On October 26,
1. SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE LATE 2019 PUBLIC
SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF EVENTS 2-3 (2020) [hereinafter SED 2019 PSPS REPORT].
2. See id. at 2-3; Marisa Sotolongo et al., California Power Shutoffs: Deficiencies in
Data and Reporting, INITIATIVE FOR ENERGY JUST., Oct. 2020, at 5, https://iejusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/V3.3-Policy-Brief-CA-Shutoffs-Data-Brief.pdf.
3. See generally SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 1; Letter from Marybel Batjer,
President, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, to William Johnson, President, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
(2019) [hereinafter CPUC Letter to PG&E]; see also Emma Newburger, More than 2 million
people expected to lose power in PG&E blackout as California wildfires rage, CNBC (Oct.
26, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/26/pge-will-shut-off-power-to-940000customers-in-northern-california-to-reduce-wildfire-risk.html.

656

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

the utility followed suit and implemented another round of electrical
blackouts impacting approximately three million Californians.4
Utility-initiated power shutoffs of this magnitude were
unprecedented for California.5 Yet, for PG&E and its broad customer
base, such planned power outages have transformed into the new normal
with the potential for lasting the next five years and beyond as the utility
initiates repairs to its extensive and decaying electrical infrastructure—
all while PG&E emerges from bankruptcy proceedings.6
Deenergization is one response PG&E has employed following its multibillion dollar judgment for the 2018 Camp Fire—to date, the deadliest
wildfire in California history.7 The cause of this devastating blaze:
PG&E’s failing infrastructure and operational mismanagement.8 Over
18,000 structures were destroyed, 153,000 acres burned, and eighty-six
people were killed.9 Following a lengthy investigation, a Butte County
Grand Jury criminally indicted PG&E for the Camp Fire.10 On March
17, 2020, PG&E pled guilty to eighty-four individual counts of

4. Dan Brekke, Lights Back On for More Than 335,000 PG&E Customers Who Lost
Power in Safety Shutoff, KQED (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11843472/pgepublic-safety-power-shutoff-red-flag-warning.
5. See CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra note 3.
6. Full Committee Hearing to Examine the Impacts of Wildfire on Electric Grid
Reliability, SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/hearings/2019/12/full-committee-hearing-to-examine-theimpacts-of-wildfire-on-electric-grid-reliability [hereinafter Senate Committee Wildfire
Hearing] (“I think for us, in Northern California, it will take us probably five years to get to
the point where we can largely eliminate this tool.”); see also Ethan Howland & Paul
Ciampoli, PG&E CEO sees power shutoffs continuing for five years, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N
(Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/pge-ceo-sees-power-shutoffscontinuing-five-years.
7. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., CAL FIRE Investigators
Determine Cause of the Camp Fire (May 15, 2019) (on file with author).
8. See Susie Cagle, This Is Why California Will Keep Burning, VICE (Apr. 17, 2019,
9:21 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvygeq/this-is-why-california-will-keepburning.
9. Meghan Bobrowsky, Camp Fire death toll rises to 86 after man who suffered thirddegree
burns
dies,
SACRAMENTO BEE
(Aug.
8,
2019,
5:25
PM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article233683422.html; see also Cleve R.
Wootson, Jr., The deadliest, most destructive wildfire in California’s history has finally been
contained,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
26,
2018,
4:22
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/25/camp-fire-deadliest-wildfirecalifornias-history-has-been-contained/.
10. Plea Agreement and Settlement 1-7, California v. PG&E, Case No. 2OCF01422,
SUPERIOR CT. OF THE ST. OF CAL., COUNTY OF BUTTE (Mar. 17, 2020) [hereinafter PG&E
Plea Agreement]; Press Release, Butte Cty. Dist. Attorney, DA Ramsey Confirms PG&E
Filing About Pleading Guilty to 85 Count Criminal Indictment on Camp Fire Deaths 1 (Mar.
23, 2020) [hereinafter Butte County Press Release].
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Involuntary Manslaughter, one count of Unlawfully Causing a Fire, and
other charges related to causing great bodily harm.11
In 2019, PG&E infrastructure was again implicated in another
blaze—the Kincade Fire in Sonoma County.12 There, the blaze burned
nearly 78,000 acres, destroyed 374 structures, and forced the evacuation
of more than 180,000 people.13 On July 16, 2020, Cal Fire confirmed
the fire “was caused by electrical transmission lines owned and operated
by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) located northeast of
Geyserville.”14 Cal Fire submitted its report to the Sonoma County
District Attorney, and on April 6, 2021, its office formally charged
PG&E with five felonies and twenty-eight misdemeanors connected
with the Kincade Fire.15
California law authorizes investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to deenergize electrical lines when increased fire risks pose imminent threats
to public safety.16 SDG&E and SCE have implemented de-energization
in the past, and SDG&E itself stands as a wildfire mitigation model.17

11. Butte County Press Release, supra note 10, at 1; Elisha Fieldstadt, PG&E to plead
guilty to involuntary manslaughter in California Camp Fire, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020,
10:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/pg-e-plead-guilty-manslaughtercalifornia-camp-fire-n1166471.
12. CPUC, PG&E’S INCIDENT REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA P.U.C. (2019),
http://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/files/doc_downloads/2019/10/IR.pdf.
13. Dale Kasler, California blames PG&E for Kincade Fire in wine country. Criminal
charges
coming?,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(July
16,
2020,
2:44
PM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article244283752.html.
14. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot, Cal Fire Investigators Determine Cause of
Kincade Fire, YUBANET.COM (July 16, 2020), https://yubanet.com/california/cal-fireinvestigators-determine-cause-of-the-kincade-fire/ [hereinafter Cause of Kincade Fire] (“The
Kincade Fire in Sonoma County . . . burned a total of 77,758 acres, destroyed 374 structures
and caused four non-life threatening injuries. After a very meticulous and thorough
investigation, CAL FIRE has determined that the Kincade Fire was caused by electrical
transmission lines owned and operated by [PG&E][.]”). See also Kasler, supra note 13.
15. Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14; see also Press Release, Sonoma Cty. Dist.
Attorney, Criminal Charges Filed Against PG&E Related to the Kincade Fire (Apr. 6, 2021)
[hereinafter Sonoma County Press Release].
16. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001); CAL.
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION ADOPTING PHASE 2 UPDATED AND ADDITIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR DE-ENERGIZATION OF ELECTRIC FACILITIES TO MITIGATE WILDFIRE RISK,
DECISION 20-05-051, at 2 (2020) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 20-05-051]; CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N, RESOLUTION EXTENDING DE-ENERGIZATION REASONABLENESS, NOTIFICATION,
MITIGATION AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN DECISION 12-04-024 TO ALL ELECTRIC
INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES, RESOLUTION ESRB-8, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter ESRB-8]; CAL.
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION GRANTING PETITION TO MODIFY DECISION 09-09-030 AND
ADOPTING FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY,
DECISION 12-04-024, at 36 (2012) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 12-04-024].
17. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 6; see Letter from Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, to San Diego Gas & Elec. (Oct. 14, 2019) [hereinafter CPUC Letter to
SDG&E].
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PG&E can similarly shut off its lines.18 While all three can exercise deenergization authority, the scale and scope of PG&E’s recent power
shutoffs dwarf SDG&E practices.19
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) retains
jurisdictional review when evaluating whether de-energization action
plans adhere to notification and mitigation requirements.20 Equally
important, the CPUC determines whether planned power shutoff events
remain consistent with other public utility duties under Commission
rules, orders, and decisions.21 Neither California law nor the CPUC
demand de-energization when dangerous weather conditions threaten
electrical infrastructure and public safety.22 Rather, the CPUC entrusts
utilities to exercise reasonable judgment when executing shutoffs as a
measure of last resort. Public Utilities Code sections 451, 399, and 399.2
still hold utilities accountable for promoting public safety by safe and
reliable operation of electrical facilities and delivering electrical service
at just and reasonable rates.23 Thus, de-energization falls under the
discretion of the utility—not the CPUC.24
Yet for PG&E, broad PSPS authority threatens to undermine public
safety by transforming a tool of last resort into a general wildfire
response based on several factors: (1) its recent emergence from
bankruptcy, (2) PG&E pleading guilty to eighty-four criminal charges
for involuntary manslaughter, and (3) its vastly decaying electrical
infrastructure—infrastructure responsible for the destructive Camp Fire
and for igniting the Kincade Fire.25 The current COVID-19 pandemic
18. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5; CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36; See
also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S RULING REGARDING PACIFIC
GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S POST-PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF CORRECTIVE
ACTION REPORTING 4 (2020) [hereinafter ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER’S RULING] (requiring
from PG&E detailed reports regarding corrective actions taken following its massive deenergization event).
19. CPUC Letter to SDG&E, supra note 17, at 1-2; but see CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra
note 3, at 2; see also Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:00:37 (“The use
of PSPS goes back to the early 2000s in California after fires in 2007 at San Diego Gas &
Electric. Twelve years later they’re [SDG&E] still doing PSPS events, but in a very narrow
surgical way.”).
20. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8; CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 35.
21. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5; see also CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note
16, at 35.
22. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8.
23. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2 (2001).
ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“We expect an IOU to use its best judgment on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether de-energization is needed for public safety.”); Press Release, Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Takes Action to Hold Communications Companies Accountable
and Increase Public Safety 1 (2019) [hereinafter CPUC Takes Action].
24. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8.
25. See generally Press Release, PG&E, PG&E Obtains All Financing Necessary to
Emerge from Chapter 11 and for Ongoing Operations (July 1, 2020),
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further exacerbates public safety dangers emanating from widespread
power shutoffs by risking households reliant on electricity for telework,
distance learning, telemedicine, and medical equipment necessary for
survival.26 Some communities already confronted the double hardship
of energy blackouts coupled with shelter-in-place orders, and several
counties have sounded the alarm for CPUC regulatory guidance.27
Recent federal public charge rule changes dissuaded immigrant
community members from seeking government help during fire and deenergization emergencies out of fear doing so would endanger their
citizenship application prospects.28 Even so, the CPUC has yet to fully
outline a comprehensive order specifically addressing de-energization
authority within the public health crisis context.29
Consequently, broad IOU de-energization authority raises two
critical questions: are utilities adhering to their legal duties to deliver
safe and reliable power, and should the CPUC assert a more direct role
over de-energization events because of their widespread impact on the
public?30 This Note directly addresses those concerns. Part II lays the
legal groundwork for de-energization authority. Part III elaborates on
the aforementioned questions by specifically asking whether IOU dehttps://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20200701_pge_eme
rges_from_chapter_11 (“[PG&E] announced today that [it] has emerged from Chapter 11[.]”).
See PG&E Plea Agreement, supra note 10, at 1. See also MICHAEL L. RAMSEY, THE CAMP
FIRE PUBLIC REPORT: A SUMMARY OF THE CAMP FIRE INVESTIGATION 82 (2020)
[hereinafter CAMP FIRE REPORT] (“The fact that PG&E was using a 97-100 year old conductor
for which they knew almost nothing is evidence of absolute indifference on the part of
PG&E.”). Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14.
26. See CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 12-13; see also Sotolongo et al.,
supra note 2, at 6.
27. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER REGARDING
DE-ENERGIZATION PROTOCOLS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, RULEMAKING 18-12005, at 1, 17-23 (2018) [hereinafter JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER]; see also Jackie
Ward, Power Shut Off For Danville Residents Sheltering-In-Place For PG&E Fire
Prevention
Work,
CBS
SF
BAYAREA (Apr.
16,
2020,
3:38
PM),
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/04/16/coronavirus-power-shut-off-for-danvilleresidents-sheltering-in-place-for-pge-fire-prevention-work/.
28. Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/green-card-processes-and-procedures/public-charge (last updated Sept. 22, 2020)
(expanding public charge rule to include aliens who have received public benefits for more
than twelve months within any thirty-six-month period). Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New
York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (granting DHS a stay on a preliminary injunction issued against
the new rule change pending disposition of government’s appeal in the Second Circuit).
29. See CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 75 (acknowledging requests for
PSPS guidance during the pandemic, but noting this decision does not address such requests);
see also Electric Utility 2020 Planning for Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS), CAL. PUB.
UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/general.aspx?id=6442465765 (last visited Jan. 6,
2021) (directing the public to review each individual utility for their 2020 PSPS protocols
during the pandemic).
30. CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 2-12.
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energization discretion: (1) threatens compliance with investment duties
under PU Codes 451, 399 and 399.2; (2) incentivizes utilities to sidestep critical repairs to their electric facilities—investments synonymous
with delivering safe and reliable power—while potentially gaining
access to a new wildfire liability fund; and (3) disproportionately
impacts socially and economically vulnerable communities. Part IV
analyzes these legal issues in further depth. Part V provides a specific
proposal for CPUC response—a recommendation squarely within its
current de-energization rules, orders, and decisions. Part VI concludes
by recommending immediate action to ensure utilities place safety first,
and consider equity when executing de-energization authority.
II. BACKGROUND
The California Constitution empowers the CPUC to regulate all
public utilities subject to its jurisdiction.31 All private corporations
controlling or managing the production, generation, transmission, or
furnishing of heat, light, or power, whether directly or indirectly to or
for the public, are public utilities subject to regulation by the California
Legislature.32 Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) PG&E, SDG&E, SCE,
and others operating within California are public utilities for purposes of
state law.33 Through the CPUC, the Legislature regulates these IOUs.34
Such regulatory power includes the CPUC authority to review utility
executed de-energization—and ensuring PSPS remains a tool of last
resort.35
A. A Brief Overview of Our Electrical Infrastructure System
Understanding the electrical infrastructure system is a prerequisite
to analyzing de-energization authority and examining its impact on
public safety. Our electrical infrastructure breaks into three main
categories: generation, transmission, and distribution.36 Generation
involves the fuels and processes employed to produce electricity;
transmission describes bulk electrical energy movement through
transmission lines from a wholesale point of generation to substations;
distribution entails the movement of electricity from a substation
31. CAL. CONST. art. XII.
32. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
33. See id.
34. See CAL. CONST. art. XII.
35. See id. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 4. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION 19-05042 ADOPTING DE-ENERGIZATION (PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUT-OFF) GUIDELINES 3
(PHASE 1 GUIDELINES) 68 (2019) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 19-05-042] (de-energization
is a “measure of last resort”).
36. K.K. DUVIVIER, ENERGY LAW BASICS 171 (2017).
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through localized lines connecting directly to customers.37 Electrical
infrastructure (the grid) embodies these complex and interconnecting
facilities generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity.38
Though similar in many characteristics, transmission and
distribution lines differ on two points. First, transmission lines channel
higher-voltage electricity to multiple customers of wholesale markets,
whereas distribution lines deliver power from substations directly to
retail customers.39 Second, transmission lines generally carry electrical
power much farther and often across state boundaries, but distribution
lines largely stay within local areas.40 These critical differences
delineate where federal and state jurisdictions apply.41
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) presides over
electricity sold at wholesale in interstate commerce, but states retain
authority over retail sales to local customers.42 FERC oversees
reliability standards of electricity sold in interstate commerce, yet the
37. See Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY & INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php (noting how the
United States relies on varying sources of energy for generation of electricity including fossil
fuels, nuclear energy and renewable energy sources, where “most electricity is generated with
steam turbines” using those energy resources). DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 171 (“In its
broadest sense, FERC defines a transmission line as one moving bulk energy products from a
wholesale point of production or generation to a point where it can be converted to be
delivered for retail sale to customers.”). Id. (“Distribution lines bring the power from the
substation to end users of electricity.”).
38. DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 100 (“In summary, most modern electricity production
in the United States passes through three phases: (1) Generation, (2) Transmission, and (3)
Distribution.”). Id. at 172 (“The term ‘grid’ to describe the collection of lines throughout the
United States suggests more order than there is in reality.”).
39. Id. at 171.
40. Id. at 172 (“[A] fundamental trait of a transmission line is that it is intended to carry
power over distances. These distances will vary. Some transmission lines remain completely
within a single state and others cross state lines.”). Id. at 171. See also Transmission Lines vs.
Distribution
Power
Lines,
PG&E,
https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/yardsafety/powerlines-and-trees/transmission-vs-distribution-power-lines.page (last visited Mar.
7, 2021) (noting how transmission lines “transport bulk electricity at high voltages ranging
from 60 kV-500kV” whereas distribution lines “[d]eliver electricity to neighborhoods and
communities over a shorter distance than transmission lines . . . [and serve as] the final stage
of electricity to homes and businesses.”).
41. What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/whatferc/what-ferc-does (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (“The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
or FERC, is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity,
natural gas, and oil . . . [FERC] [r]egulates the transmission and wholesale sales of electricity
in interstate commerce” but “[m]any areas outside of FERC’s jurisdictional responsibility are
dealt with by State Public Utility Commissions” including “[r]egulation of retail electricity
and natural gas sales to consumers”).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)-(b) (2015) (extending federal regulatory power over electricity to
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, and the sale of electric energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce). What FERC Does, supra note 41 (noting how FERC does
not regulate retail electricity sales to customers, reliability problems related to local
distribution facilities, and tree trimmings near local distribution lines in residential areas).
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Federal Power Act—which created FERC—makes no mention of safety
standards for delivering the same electrical power.43 FERC jurisdiction
over the electric power industry remains limited and largely concerns the
transmission of electrical energy flowing through interstate commerce,
and setting rates conforming to just and reasonable standards.44 In
contrast, California prioritizes safety and reliability when regulating
utilities generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical power within
state boundaries.45
B. De-Energization Legal Authority
The absence of a federal safety power mandate lends to our focused
discussion on de-energization at the state and local level. Specifically,
our analysis centers on how the CPUC steps in to address a critical
regulatory safety gap, and thus retains broad regulatory authority over
utilities—including reviewing de-energization for reasonableness and
ensuring it remains as a tool of last resort.46 California Public Utilities
Codes 451, 399, and 399.2 take center stage in our discussion because
these provisions ground PSPS authority, outline IOU requirements, and
highlight CPUC responsibilities when ensuring utilities furnish electric
service to promote the health and safety of the public.
1. California Public Utilities Code § 451
The CPUC retains authority to “fix rates, establish rules, examine
records, issue [subpoenas] . . . and prescribe a uniform system of
accounts for utilities subject to its jurisdiction.”47 Within this same
oversight power, the CPUC permits IOUs to execute a Power Shut-Off
Plan when extreme weather conditions pose an increased fire risk to
public safety.48 But the ultimate decision to de-energize falls at the

43. Id.
44. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT
1-2 (2020).
45. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODES § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
46. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2-6.
47. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
48. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“Under PU Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric
IOUs have the authority to shut off power in order to protect public safety.”). See generally
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAN DIEGO GAS &
ELECTRIC COMPANY’S APPLICATION TO SHUT OFF POWER DURING PERIODS OF HIGH
DANGER, DECISION 09-09-030 69 (2009) [hereinafter CPUC DECISION 09-09-030] (“SDG&E
has authority under §§ 451 and 399.2(a) to shut off power in emergency situations when
necessary to protect public safety. Any decision by SDG&E to shut off power may be
reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its broad jurisdiction regarding the safety of public
utility operations and facilities.”).
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discretion of the utility—not the CPUC.49 De-energization serves as a
critical tool of last resort when hazardous weather conditions merit
cutting off electrical power, but remains an impermissible general
wildfire response.50
California PU Code 451 is of critical importance here because it
directs: (1) every public utility to provide and maintain “adequate,
efficient, just, and reasonable service” as (2) “necessary to promote the
safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, employees, and
the public.”51 In essence, PU Code 451 requires IOUs to deliver electric
service for promoting the safety of the public.52 However, this provision
alone does not supply the legal basis for IOU de-energization authority.
PU Code 451 works in conjunction with PU Code 399.2, a provision
laying out the utility mandate to operate infrastructure and deliver
electricity in a safe and reliable manner.53
2. California Public Utilities Code § 399.2
PU Code 399.2 teases out utility obligations under PU Code 451
(promoting public safety) by ordering electric providers to: (1) operate
electric distribution lines in a “safe, reliable, efficient, and cost-effective
manner;” (2) control and maintain utility-owned electric distribution
grids, and; (3) manage electric distribution grids in service territories
consistent with Section 330.54
PU 399.2 serves a distinct,
complementary function to PU 451: it reinforces reliable electric service
as a critical state interest, but equally mandates reasonable infrastructure
investments—a point elaborated later in this discussion.55
49. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“We expect an IOU to use its best judgment on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether de-energization is needed for public safety.”).
50. See generally CPUC Takes Action, supra note 23.
51. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977) (“Every public utility shall furnish and
maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment,
and facilities . . . as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of
its patrons, employees, and the public.”).
52. Id.; see also Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Safe, Reliable Service at Just and Reasonable
Rates: Priorities, Challenges, and Opportunities, STAN. L. SCH. 4 (Apr. 25, 2013),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organiz
ation/Commissioners/Catherine_Sandoval/Stanford_2013_Presentation.pdf.
53. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2.
54. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(b) (2001) (“It is the policy of this state, and the
intent of the Legislature, to reaffirm that each electrical corporation shall continue to operate
its electric distribution grid in its service territory and shall do so in a safe, reliable, efficient,
and cost-effective manner.”).
55. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001) (“In carrying out the purposes of this
section, each electrical corporation shall continue to make reasonable investments in its
electric distribution grid.”). See also Reliable Electric Service Investments Act, CAL. PUB.
UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001) (“The Legislature further finds and declares that in order to ensure
that the citizens of this state continue to receive safe, reliable, affordable, and environmentally
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Fundamentally, PU Code 399.2 directs utilities to operate electrical
distribution grids within their service territories in a safe and reliable
manner.56
Herein lies de-energization. Cutting electric power appears
antithetical to providing reliable service; however, utilities must deliver
power safely. PU Code 451 (promoting public safety) demands every
public utility must: “furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just,
and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities . . .
as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience
of its patrons, employees, and the public.”57 In turn, PU Code 399.2
holds utilities accountable for the safe and reliable operation of their
electrical infrastructure.58 The end result: when weather phenomenon
acutely threatens safe delivery of reliable power, thus risking the public,
then an IOU stands empowered to shut off electricity to affected areas
because it must operate in a safe manner.59 Together, these codes form
the basis of de-energization authority.
3. California Public Utilities Code § 330
Though not included in the de-energization legal framework,
California PU Code 330 remains relevant in our discussion for two brief
reasons. The provision emphasizes safe and reliable power under PU
Codes 451 (promoting public safety) and 399.2 (safe and reliable
operation) by assigning the CPUC and electric utilities additional duties
concerning safety, reliability, inspection, and maintenance of electric
transmission and distribution systems.60
First, PU Code 330 follows the same theme of safe energy
reliability: “[r]eliable electric service is of utmost importance to the
safety, health, and welfare of the state’s citizenry.”61 PU Code 330
underscores the mandates highlighted in PU Codes 451 (promoting
public safety) and 399.2 (safe and reliable operation) and further grounds
CPUC authority to protect public safety.62 Unlike FERC, the CPUC
sustainable electric service, it is essential that prudent investments continue to be made [to]
protect the integrity of the electric distribution grid [and to] ensure an adequately sized and
trained utility workforce[.]”).
56. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
57. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977).
58. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (a)(1)(2001); see also ESRB-8, supra 16, at 8
(“Under PU Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric IOUs have authority to shut off power
in order to protect public safety.”).
59. Id.; see also CPUC DECISION 09-09-030, supra note 48, at 61-62; CPUC DECISION
12-04-024, supra note 16, at 3-4; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2.
60. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(f)-(i) (2001).
61. Id.
62. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(g) (2001).
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goes beyond federal reliability requirements by specifically addressing
safety standards for electric power service.63 This distinction remains
important because the federal authority does not inhibit the CPUC from
taking necessary action when protecting public safety, regulating
electrical infrastructure operation, and utility delivery of electric service
at the local level.64 Moreover, the CPUC wields broad jurisdiction over
formulating and revisiting de-energization rules, orders, and
requirements—a power this discussion highlights and recommends
exercising to ensure utilities do not resort to de-energization in lieu of
postponing critical infrastructure repairs.65
Second—along with PU Code 399.2 (safe and reliable operation)—
PU Code 330 reinforces how reliable delivery of electricity depends on
diligent inspection and maintenance of electric transmission and
distribution lines.66 In doing so, PU Code 330 encourages the CPUC to
work with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)—the
state grid operator—in setting standards for those inspections,
maintenance, and repairs.67 Yet, utilities like PG&E remain obligated to
provide safe and reliable electric power at “just and reasonable rates,”68
in addition to performing conscientious inspections and maintaining
their electrical facilities.69 In doing so, utilities retain a protected
opportunity to receive a fair return on investment in their electrical
infrastructure.70 This compromise exemplifies a regulatory compact
where a utility receives a government-backed monopoly and a protected
fair return opportunity in exchange for state regulation of rates, profits,
and delivery of safe and reliable power to the public.71
63. What FERC Does, supra note 41.
64. See id.
65. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330 (2001); see also ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8 (“The
decision to shut off power may be reviewed by the Commission pursuant to its broad
jurisdiction over public safety and utility operations.”).
66. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(i) (2001).
67. Id.
68. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); see Sandoval, supra note 52.
69. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330(i) (2001).
70. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001) (outlining how each electrical corporation
enjoys a reasonable opportunity to fully recover from all of its customers all “reasonable
investments in its electric distribution grid,” “reasonable return[s]” on those investments,
and “reasonable costs to operate its electric distribution grid.”). See generally Maryam
Ghadessi & Marzia Zafar, An Introduction to Utility Cost of Capital, CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N
(Apr.
18,
2017),
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organiz
ation/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)/PP
D-An-Introduction-to-Utility-Cost-of-Capital.pdf.
71. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(b). See Cagle, supra note 8 (“The construction
of [the] private utility system was ‘a grand bargain,’ ” says University of California, Santa
Barbara, political science professor Leah Stokes. “They said, ‘we want to be private
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C. IOU Duties Under California Public Utilities Codes § 451, § 399,
and § 399.2
Operating collectively, PU Codes 451, 399 and 399.2 mandate
utilities: (1) promote public safety by (2) controlling, maintaining and
diligently investing in electric infrastructure (3) through safe and reliable
operation when delivering electric service to the public.72 PU Codes 451
and 399.2 mandate safe and reliable power flowing from utilities to
customers.73 PU Code 330 encourages the CPUC to set diligent
inspection and maintenance standards of electric transmission and
distribution lines.74 But another critical legal responsibility exists: the
utility obligation to reasonably invest in its own electrical infrastructure
as outlined in PU Code 399.2(c).75 The pivotal question presented in this
discussion centers on whether de-energization when left to IOU
discretion undermines mandates to reasonably invest in utility-owned
infrastructure, and, if so, how the CPUC should step in with an
infrastructure investment inquiry to ensure de-energization does not
become a practical general wildfire response. Thus, PU Code 399.2(c)
raises two relevant points.
On the first point, IOUs must provide safe and reliable power but
shall do so in conjunction with diligent investments in their electrical
infrastructure.76 When extreme weather conditions arise or persist, IOUs
can de-energize their local lines to protect public safety.77 The CPUC
makes no distinction between utility authority to shut off distribution
lines versus transmission lines, and CAISO—the state power grid
operator—maintains how “[u]tilities may de-energize both distribution
and high-voltage transmission lines as needed.”78 Nevertheless, deenergization does not negate the responsibility to maintain electrical
monopolies, we have to have a guaranteed market to make our product cheaper because we
have all these fixed costs. So government said okay, if you’re a monopoly, we have to regulate
you.[’] ” ) . DUVIVIER, supra note 36, at 57 (“In this newly established arrangement, often
called the ‘regulatory compact,’ utility companies would receive a government-backed
monopoly, with guaranteed territories for selling their products. In exchange, the government
would be able to regulate the rates and profits of the regulated utilities.”).
72. CAL. PUB. UTILS.CODE §§ 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2 (2001).
73. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451; CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
74. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 330 (2001).
75. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001).
76. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
77. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8.
78. See FACT SHEET: PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF (PSPS) PROGRAM, CAL. INDEP.
SYS. OPERATOR (2020). ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8-9 (emphasizing only how “[u]nder PU
Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a), electric IOUs have the authority to shut off power in order
to protect public safety[,]” and how “[d]e-energization of electric facilities could save lives,
protect property, and prevent fires.”).
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facilities, ensure an adequately sized and trained workforce, and employ
reasonable investments in utility-owned electrical infrastructure.79 Such
infrastructure investments logically include repairing and replacing
faulty or excessively old facilities.80 Certainly, operating electrical
infrastructure well beyond life expectancy cannot constitute delivering
safe and reliable power.81
Second, for PG&E, where operational mismanagement and
infrastructure failures resulted in significant liability and loss of life, deenergization presents a dangerous opportunity for abuse.82 Unfettered
de-energization discretion potentially delays repairing and replacing
electrical facilities, thus risking public safety—conduct contravening
utility obligations to deliver safe and reliable power through a prudently
maintained energy infrastructure.83 PG&E points to climate change and
unpredictable weather phenomena as equal culprits contributing to
wildfire dangers.84 The utility argues PSPS is the only certain way to
prevent ignition during high wind weather events.85
D. Climate Change Challenges, De-Energization and Utility
Obligations
Certainly, extreme weather conditions exacerbate wildfire dangers.
Prolonged summer heatwaves increase dry vegetation growing
alongside electrical infrastructure, consequently leaving electrical
facilities at the mercy of high winds flowing onshore.86 Such

79. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
80. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
81. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001). See also CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84 (“During the post Camp Fire
inspections, worn C hooks and worn hanger holes were found throughout the PG&E Overhead
Transmission System. Despite the knowledge C hooks and hanger holes wear over time and
despite the knowledge of the danger inherent in the failure of a C hook or hanger hole, the
evidence clearly established nobody in PG&E was inspecting C hooks and hanger holes.”).
82. CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 82-87.
83. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
84. Kavya Balaraman, PG&E CEO promises ‘shorter, fewer’ shut-offs continuing for the
next 5 years, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-ceo-shutoffs-shorter-fewer-five-years/569466/.
85. PG&E, 2020 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN REPORT 4-1 (2020) [hereinafter PG&E
2020 WMP REPORT].
86. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 3 (“After several years of drought,
changing weather patterns, extreme high heat, ferocious winds, and low humidity, among
other factors, the 2018 fire season in California was the most destructive on record. July 2018
was the hottest month on record in California.”); Tim Arango et al., 5 Lessons We Learned
from the California Wildfires in 2019, NY TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/us/fires-california.html.
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circumstances translate into a direct cause and effect relationship where
“[d]rier plants catch fire more easily,” thus sparking massive fire events;
here, de-energization aids as a useful and flexible tool adaptable to such
wildfire emergencies.87
CPUC Rules (including General Order 95) specifically address the
danger live wires present when coming into contact with vegetation.88
GO 95 requires utilities to perform year-round clearance of vegetation
coming within eighteen inches of power lines and vegetation coming
within four feet of high voltage lines in areas the CPUC designates as a
High Fire-Threat District (HFTD).89 Still, for California, drought
conditions are increasing drier vegetation and more areas are being
classified as a HFTD.90 For PG&E, over half of its service territory lies
within HFTD areas.91
In late 2020, the state endured one of the most destructive fire
seasons with an estimated 4.2 million acres burned; the August Complex
currently stands as the largest in modern California history at one million
acres, and five out of the six largest California fires recorded occurred
this past year.92 In Fresno County, the Creek Fire—cited as the largest
single wildfire in state history—destroyed approximately $250 million
worth of homes.93 While the August Complex resulted from lightning
and the Creek Fire remains under investigation,94 the impetus remains
the same: deteriorating weather conditions are leaving dry brush at the
87. Arango et al., supra note 86; see also ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 8.
88. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 4. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
RULES FOR OVERHEAD ELECTRIC LINE CONSTRUCTION GENERAL ORDER NO. 95 III-19
(2018) [hereinafter GO 95] (explaining Rule 35 vegetation management guidelines and
establishing necessary and reasonable clearances minimums for all overheard electrical
supply facilities).
89. GO 95, supra note 88, at III-19, III-24-25. Laws and Regulations GO 95, PG&E,
https://www.pge.com/en_US/safety/yard-safety/powerlines-and-trees/lawsandregulations.page#:~:text=General%20Order%2095%2C%20issued%20by,designated%2
0High%20Fire%2DThreat%20Districts (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
90. See PG&E 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 85, at 1-2.
91. Id. (“Approximately 5,500 line-miles of electric transmission and 25,500 line-miles
of distribution assets lie within these HFTDs.”).
92. Jeff Masters, Reviewing the horrid global 2020 wildfire season, YALE CLIMATE
CONNECTIONS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2021/01/reviewing-thehorrid-global-2020-wildfire-season/ (highlighting the August Complex Fires as the largest in
California state history at a size of 1.03 million acres).
93. Manuela Tobias, Creek Fire is a $500 million-plus mystery. How investigators plan
to
solve
the
case,
FRESNO
BEE
(Dec.
31,
2020,
9:24
AM),
https://www.fresnobee.com/news/california/fires/article248158005.html (noting the Creek
Fire as the single largest in California history).
94. August
Complex:
Incident
Information,
INCIWEB,
https://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/6983/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). Tobias, supra note 93
(“Federal and state officials declined to give details on the cause of the Creek Fire, citing an
ongoing federal investigation.”).
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mercy of ignition sources.95 As PG&E points out, even a “perfectly
sound [electrical] system with everything working well” is not immune
to climate change; even when vegetation management adheres to CPUC
rules excessive wind can carry debris onto live electrical lines.96 PG&E
faces a particularly dangerous situation because the utility furnishes
power to millions of Californians dispersed over a vast service territory
“uniquely exposed to climate impacts because of its geography and
vegetation.”97
Nevertheless, climate change complications fail as a viable defense
for PG&E on two points. First, SDG&E exemplifies a multi-faceted
approach when addressing wildfire dangers by executing broad
infrastructure upgrades in conjunction with localized, small-scale deenergization events.98 Even former PG&E CEO Bill Johnson noted how
SDG&E employs de-energization events in “a very narrow surgical
way.”99 SDG&E improved mitigation efforts following its own fatal
liabilities during the 2007 wildfire season—but PG&E did not.100
Instead, investigations into the Camp Fire revealed 100-year old PG&E
electrical equipment ignited the deadly blaze.101 In its Camp Fire Report,
the Butte County District Attorney explicitly noted how PG&E
discovered and possessed detailed information confirming the
deteriorated state of its electrical infrastructure, yet failed to sufficiently
inspect its electrical equipment used for restraining dangerous overhead
transmission lines in place.102
Second, extreme weather phenomenon does not abrogate utility
duties. Rather, such phenomenon reinforces the legal duties of due
95. Masters, supra note 92 (explaining how a “once-in-50-year” weather event along
with heat and drought contributed to a disastrous 2020 California Wildfire Season).
96. Balaraman, supra note 84.
97. Id.
98. See Claire Trageser, PG&E Blasted For Not Being More Like SDG&E In Managing
Power Shutoffs, But Is The Comparison Fair?, KPBS (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/oct/24/pge-blasted-not-being-more-sdge-managing-powershu/ (noting how SDG&E made changes only after power lines ignited fires in 2007 which
burned down hundreds of homes and killed two people).
99. Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:00:54.
100. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84.
101. Id. at 83-84.
102. Id. (“In 2018 the discovery of keyhole wear on hanger plates on the par transmission
line caused enough concern that the Transmission Line Supervisor sent the plates to the PG&E
lab for analysis and evaluation. Unlike in 1987, in 2018 the lab actually did a metallurgical
evaluation. A PG&E lab scientist, with a PhD in Material Science and Engineering, used the
available data to opine the keyhole wear was occurring at a rate of .007 inches per year. Based
on average wear rate, the PG&E lab scientist determined the useful life of those hanger plates
to be between 97 and 100 years old. PG&E now had scientific confirmation of the body-onbody wear caused by the constant movement of the C hooks within the hanger holes and had
an estimate of average wear per year. Nothing was done.”).
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diligence in safely operating and maintaining electrical infrastructure—
including inspecting, repairing and replacing facilities at risk—either
because of the weather events themselves or the deteriorated status of
the infrastructure.103 Climate change exacerbates drier conditions and
vegetation conducive for devastating wildfires; wind presents the danger
of carrying such debris onto live lines, but the choice to operate electrical
infrastructure without the proper upgrades, repairs or replacement falls
with the utility alone.104
Utility decisions of this nature endanger property, the public and
contravene obligations under PU Codes 451 (promoting public safety),
399 (prudent infrastructure investments), and 399.2 (safe and reliable
operation).105 The Camp Fire devastation stands as a notable example
of the deadly choice resulting from operating dangerously decaying
infrastructure. As the CPUC notes: “[e]lectrical utility infrastructure has
historically been responsible for less than ten percent of reported
wildfires; however, fires attributed to power lines comprise roughly half
of the most destructive fires in California history.”106
Herein lies the danger of broad de-energization discretion: utilities
stand emboldened in manipulating PSPS to address imminent wildfire
dangers—arguing public safety necessitated those power shutoffs—all
while postponing or forfeiting their legal duty to prudently invest in their
electrical infrastructure. The 2019 PSPS shutoffs affecting millions of
customers exemplify the extent utilities will go to avoid further
catastrophic liabilities in the name of public safety.107 The central thesis
of our discussion focuses on whether utilities like PG&E are at increased
risk for abusing de-energization authority as a general wildfire response
to stave off further wildfire incidents connected to its equipment in lieu
103. See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a)-(c) (2001).
104. CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84 (“Despite the efforts of PG&E personnel
to distance the company from the ‘Run to Failure’ model, the evidence clearly establishes
quite the opposite. PG&E had knowledge of the potential consequences of failure of the nearly
100-year-old C hooks, yet PG&E continued its policy of ‘Run to Failure[.]’ ” ). Cagle, supra
note 8.
105. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
106. Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) / De-Energization, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
107. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS
Events
and
Consider
Enforcement
Actions
(Nov.
13,
2019),
https://yubanet.com/california/cpuc-to-examine-recent-utility-psps-events-and-considerenforcement-actions/ [hereinafter CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS Events] (comments
by PUC Commissioner Genevieve Shiroma) (“It is important for the CPUC to determine if
the utilities complied with using [PSPS] as a last resort, and to collect the knowledge gained
towards any revisions needed for next year[.]”). See also SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note
1, at 2-3.
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of costly infrastructure repairs.108 The next question then evaluates
whether directing an IOU to repair or replace utility-owned facilities
violates its constitutional right to just compensation.
E. The Federal Mandate: A Fair Return on Investment
Fair returns on utility investment is a complex area directly
implicating IOU de-energization authority in three ways: (1) IOUs are
entitled to a fair return on infrastructure investment,109 (2) the CPUC
must balance just compensation and the statutory requirement for just
and reasonable rates under PU Code 451 with the public interest of
receiving safe and reliable power,110 and (3) broad de-energization
discretion incentivizes financially distressed entities like PG&E to
postpone or sidestep critical investments. Together, these factors pose
significant challenges when weighing public safety risks and the utility
duty to furnish safe and reliable power.
First, IOUs require a sufficient return to attract investor capital
while keeping costs low for ratepayers.111 The U.S. Constitution entitles
public utilities to an opportunity for earning a fair return on investment
when providing services to the public.112 The right does not guarantee a
fair return, but protects the ability to gain one.113 The return should be
sufficient to instill confidence regarding the financial stability of the
utility, but ought to reflect the return on investment comparable to other
entities sharing similar risks.114 Denying a public utility the chance to
earn a fair return raises serious constitutional issues of just
108. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 84; Cause of Kincade Fire, supra note 14.
109. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (“When, therefore, one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has thus created.”). See generally L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R.
Comm’n of Cal., 289 U.S. 287 (1933) (explaining that rate regulation cannot be confiscatory).
110. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODES § 451 (1977) (obligating utilities to provide just and
reasonable service as necessary to promote public safety).
111. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3.
112. See generally L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 289 U.S. at 305-06 (“[T]he judicial function
does not go beyond the decision of the constitutional question. That question is whether the
rates as fixed are confiscatory . . . [and] that what the complainant is entitled to demand, in
order it may have ‘just compensation,’ is ‘a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
property at the time it is being used for the public.’ ” ).
113. Id. at 3-4.
114. Id. at 3 (citing Bluefield Water Works & Improv. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W.
Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923)) (“The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence
in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and
economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise money
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.”). Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat.
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (“[T]he return to the equity owner should be commensurate
with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.”).
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compensation—a due process violation.115 Inquiries into a fair return
require a regulator to evaluate all relevant facts—an analysis not
amenable to simplified formulas or calculations.116 For purposes of this
discussion, we need only remember an IOU’s constitutional right to earn
a fair return on investment.117
Second, an IOU’s protected right to seek a fair return complicates
the CPUC’s duty to the public. PU Code 451 requires utilities to
maintain their equipment and facilities as necessary to promote the
safety, health, and convenience of the public.118 Section 399.2(c)
requires utilities to reasonably invest in their electrical distribution grids,
facilities, and operations.119 PU Code 399 guarantees utilities recover
from their customers all reasonable investments in their facilities and
operations reasonably necessary to carry out service to customers.120
Common sense informs us IOUs will not repair or replace owned
facilities when investment returns cannot be expected: “[i]nvestors
expect to earn a return on their capital.”121 Thus, the CPUC walks a
delicate line of balancing competing interests: prioritizing ratepayer
access to safe and reliable power at just and reasonable rates on the one
hand, while fulfilling a constitutional mandate of permitting utilities an
opportunity to recover a fair investment return on the other.122
Third, broad de-energization discretion frustrates juggling IOU just
compensation and the public interest of receiving safe and reliable
service. At one end, de-energization serves its narrow legitimate
function as a vital tool of last resort.123 IOUs may exercise deenergization when anticipating dangerous weather conditions posing
115. See L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
116. Id. at 306.
117. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3-4 (citing Bluefield, 262 U.S. 679) (“The legal
standard for setting a fair rate of return has been established by the United States Supreme
Court in the Bluefield and Hope decisions. That decision states that a public utility should be
provided an opportunity to earn a return necessary for it to provide utility service.”). See also
L.A. Gas & Electric Corp, 289 U.S. at 304-306 (“We have emphasized the distinctive function
of the Court . . . to enforce constitutional rights . . . [t]his Court has repeatedly held that the
basis of calculation is the fair value of the property, that is, that what the complainant is
entitled to demand, in order that it may have ‘just compensation,’ is ‘a fair return upon the
reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for the public.’ ” ).
118. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977).
119. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c)(1) (2001).
120. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(d) (2001) (“For purposes of this section, the term
‘electric distribution grid’ means those facilities owned or operated by an electrical
corporation that are not under the control of the Independent System Operator and that are
used to transmit, deliver, or furnish electricity for light, heat, or power.”).
121. Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3.
122. Id. (“The [CPUC] has the responsibility to authorize a return high enough to attract
[investor] capital and low enough to minimize [ratepayer] costs.”).
123. See ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 2-3.
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increased fire dangers, but the CPUC retains review power when
evaluating shutoff decisions, notice, and mitigation requirements.124 At
the other end, broad IOU de-energization discretion endangers the public
by swallowing up reasonable investment mandates in utility facilities.
Infrastructure investments remain necessary for providing safe and
reliable power to consumers.125
F. A Comparative Look at SDG&E and PG&E
SDG&E exemplifies wildfire mitigation efforts integrating deenergization with infrastructure repairs and upgrades.126 SDG&E
committed $1.5 billion to wildfire preparation, including relocating
power lines underground and constructing smaller electrical grids for
executing de-energization events at a localized level.127 In contrast,
PG&E’s 2019 Wildfire Safety Plan (WSP) expands PSPS from 7,000
circuit miles of targeted distribution lines to over 25,000 miles and
potential transmission line de-energization from 370 circuit miles to over
5,500.128 Yet, PG&E intended to only repair or replace 150 circuit miles
of its electrical infrastructure by the end of 2019, another 600 circuit
miles each year from 2020 through 2022, and complete 7,100 within ten
years.129
PG&E alleges that a low supply of required materials and trained
personnel impede the completion of its infrastructure inspection and
corrective work on a faster timeline.130 Those circumstances potentially
violate PU Code 399 because PG&E must maintain sufficient resources
and an adequately sized and trained workforce for safe and reliable
infrastructure operation; such failures endanger de-energization
becoming a general wildfire response in lieu of supply and workforce
failures.131

124. Id. at 2.
125. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(a) (2001).
126. See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N SAFETY & ENFORCEMENT DIVISION,
REVIEW OF SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY DECEMBER 2017 DE-ENERGIZATION
EVENTS (2018); see also Trageser, supra note 98.
127. Trageser, supra note 98.
128. PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AMENDED 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY
PLAN 96 (2019), https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergencypreparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/Wildfire-Safety-Plan.pdf [hereinafter PG&E 2019
WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN].
129. Id. at 63.
130. Id. at 55.
131. Id. See also CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001) (“[I]n order to ensure that the
citizens of this state continue to receive safe [and] reliable . . . electric service, it is essential
that prudent investments continue to be made in all of the following areas [including] . . . an
adequately sized and trained utility workforce.”).
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In its 2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan, PG&E states it completed
system hardening of overhead distribution lines in High Fire-Threat
Districts for 171 miles, plans to target 241 miles in 2020, and complete
a total of 7,100 miles of hardening over the next twelve to fourteen years;
for 2021, PG&E aims to harden 180 miles of higher risk overhead
facilities—though that number is a drop from its 2020 mileage target.132
The utility also explains how it anticipates reducing PSPS impact over
the next ten years through different fire risk assessment tools but leaves
open the possibility of increased de-energization based on climate
models indicating a higher probability of more frequent fire weather
conditions.133 Still, the miles targeted for system hardening pale in
comparison to those mentioned for de-energization in the 2019 PG&E
WSP.134
Of course, simply comparing PG&E to SDG&E then concluding
why the former should emulate the latter ignores key differences
between the two utilities. The PG&E service area of 70,000 square miles
dwarfs SDG&E’s 4,100 square miles; SDG&E falls at a quarter of
PG&E’s 16 million total customer base, and PG&E service territory
includes denser tree and human population, thus increasing fire hazards
and wildfire mitigation costs.135 Nonetheless, PG&E’s financial
dilemma, its extensive liability to wildfire victims, and its continuously
decaying infrastructure furnishing electricity to millions of Californians
leaves de-energization as the tool for wildfire mitigation.136 The CPUC
forbids de-energization as a liability reducing method:
[T]he utilities should continue to strengthen their infrastructure to
minimize the need for and size of de-energization events. Under no
circumstances may the utilities employ de-energization solely as a
means of reducing their own liability risk from utility-infrastructure
wildfire ignitions, and the utilities must be able to justify why de-

132. PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY UPDATED 2020 WILDFIRE
MITIGATION PLAN REPORT 3, 7 (2020) [hereinafter UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT]
(explaining system hardening as replacing bare overhead conductors by eliminating the line
entirely, undergrounding or replacing with covered conductor and stronger poles); see also
PG&E, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 2021 WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLAN REPORT
558 (2021) [hereinafter PG&E 2021 WMP REPORT].
133. Id. at 8-18, 4-27 (citing the need to de-energize some transmission and distribution
lines to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires, but also efforts to reduce PSPS impact).
134. Compare PG&E 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN, supra note 128, at 5 (detailing how
in 2019, PG&E intends to complete 150 miles of system hardening in high-fire threat
districts), with UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-25, 4-27 (noting how
PG&E is evaluating 552 miles transmission line miles in HFTD to determine whether to
remove from future PSPS events).
135. Trageser, supra note 98.
136. See Cagle, supra note 8.
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energization was deployed over other possible measures or
actions.137

For PG&E, the incentive of resorting to de-energization remains great.
Its recent emergence from bankruptcy—coupled with wildfire
settlement claims valued at $25.5 billion—presents much doubt as to
whether PG&E will implement power shutoffs only as a tool of last
resort; as it emerges from bankruptcy, PG&E instead appears to focus
on expansion of its executive level officers.138 At the same time,
PG&E’s post-bankruptcy commitments vaguely reference its objective
to repairing, replacing, or upgrading its infrastructure responsible for
those wildfire settlements.139 The only concrete details are found in
PG&E’s WMP Reports: 171 miles completed in 2019, 241 miles
targeted for 2020, 180 miles targeted for 2021, with an overall 7,100
miles of overhead facility hardening to occur over a twelve-fourteen year
timespan.140 Consequently, broad PG&E de-energization authority
poses a specific and growing danger to the public because of its current
financial status, past criminal liability, and expansive utility territory
servicing millions of Californians—factors collectively potentially
postponing critical infrastructure repairs.141
The California Constitution vests the California Legislature and the
CPUC with the authority to set just compensation for utilities.142 This
includes allowing a utility to recover a reasonable return for investing in
its electrical infrastructure.143 The CPUC must allow an IOU a fair return

137. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 68.
138. See PG&E Achieves Bankruptcy Court Confirmation of its Plan of Reorganization,
PG&E (June 20, 2020), https://www.pgecurrents.com/2020/06/20/pge-achieves-bankruptcycourt-confirmation-of-its-plan-of-reorganization/ (emphasizing governance, oversight and
operational strengthening by establishing a new safety committee, new board of directors, and
expanding responsibilities for certain executive-level officers).
139. Compare id., with PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric Company Case
No. 19-30088, PG&E, https://restructuring.primeclerk.com/pge/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021)
(case background) (“Throughout the Chapter 11 Process, PG&E remains committed to . . .
[c]ontinuing to make critical investments in system safety and maintenance[.]”).
140. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 3, 7; see also Kavya Balaraman,
PG&E exits bankruptcy, but long-term wildfire risk would put it ‘back in the soup’, UTIL.
DIVE (July 6, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-exits-bankruptcy-but-long-termwildfire-risk-could-put-it-back-in-th/581017/; see also PG&E 2021 WMP REPORT, supra
note 132, at 558.
141. Katie Worth & Karen Pinchin, After Deadly Fire, Regulators and Consumers
Question
PG&E
Blackouts,
PBS
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/deadly-paradise-fire-regulators-consumers-pgeblackouts-pge-outage/. See generally CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25.
142. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
143. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2(c) (2001).
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on infrastructure investment; failing to do so would amount to
confiscatory ratesetting prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.144
In 2019, PG&E estimated how complying with inspection and
vegetation trimming requests would yield costs between $75 and $150
billion—an amount the utility argues would pass down to ratepayers:
“PG&E would inevitably need to turn to California ratepayers for
funding, resulting in a substantial increase—an estimated one-year
increase of more than five times current rates in typical utility bills.”145
Currently, PG&E assets hover at $94 billion, with annual revenue
slightly above $17 billion.146 But in December 2020, PG&E received
CPUC approval for rate increases to fund infrastructure repairs aimed at
reducing de-energization execution—a reminder of the CPUC obligation
to allow utilities a fair return opportunity for their infrastructure
investment costs.147 Thus, one question arises: how can the CPUC
ensure PG&E commits to repairing its infrastructure (on account of the
ratepayer increase) while reducing power shutoffs? In exploring this
question, the discussion evaluates current CPUC orders addressing
utility de-energization requirements.
G. De-Energization Requirements
The CPUC outlines several requirements public utilities must
satisfy when exercising de-energization.148 CPUC Resolution ESRB-8
extends de-energization authority to all IOUs but mandates utilities: (1)
employ all “feasible and appropriate attempts” to notify customers of a
planned power shutoff before executing such a plan; (2) provide a
detailed report of the de-energization event to the Director of Safety
Enforcement Division (SED)—a division of the CPUC—and; (3)

144. See L.A.Gas & Elec. Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 289 U.S. 287, 314-17 (1933)
(holding that the United States Constitution prohibits confiscatory rate setting).
145. Jim Christie, PG&E puts cost of judge’s wildfire plan at up to $150 billion, REUTERS
(Jan. 23, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pg-e-us-wildfire/pge-puts-costof-judges-wildfire-plan-at-up-to-150-billion-idUSKCN1PI00P.
146. PG&E (PCG), FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/companies/pge/?sh=7ceac70545e4
(last updated Jan. 27, 2021). See Madeleine Gregory, Millions of Californians Lost Power
Because PG&E Refused to Spend Money to Fix Its Problems, VICE (Oct. 11, 2019, 7:19 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a35y38/millions-of-californians-lost-power-becausepgande-refused-to-spend-money-to-fix-its-problems.
147. PG&E Receives State Approval for Investments Aimed at Improving Safety,
Reducing Wildfire Risk and Building a Stronger Energy System for the Future, PG&E,
https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20201203_pge_rece
ives_state_approval_for_investments_aimed_at_improving_safety_reducing_wildfire_risk_
and_building_a_stronger_energy_system_for_the_future (last visited Jan. 27, 2021)
[hereinafter PG&E GRC Rate Approval].
148. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5-9.
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highlight mitigation efforts addressing de-energization consequences.149
The CPUC retains reasonableness review power over de-energization
efforts, but has yet to outline concrete reasonableness guidelines.150
Instead, the CPUC defers to IOU expertise, knowledge, and
jurisdiction for exercising de-energization.151
The Commission
emphasizes de-energization notification as its prime focus.152 Yet,
absent from CPUC de-energization requirements are the utility legal
duties to invest in critical infrastructure and workforce—directives under
PU Codes 399 and 399.2(c).153 In leaving such mandates out, the CPUC
fails to incorporate necessary evaluations into whether utilities are
dedicating reasonable investments to their electrical infrastructure—
investments critical for reducing the need for expansive de-energization
events.
1. Public Notification
Resolution ESRB-8 demands all electric IOUs take “feasible and
appropriate attempts” to warn the public of an impending planned
power-shutoff.154 ESRB-8 does not elaborate on “feasible” and
“appropriate” efforts; however, ESRB-8 highlights two explicit
notification requirements. First, IOUs must notify likely affected local
communities before effectuating their de-energization plans regardless
if a power shut off occurs.155 No specific time length is given, but an
IOU must explain its failure to provide customers with at least two hours
prior notice.156 Decision 12-04-024—as applied to SDG&E—sheds
further light on public alert considerations. There, SDG&E articulated
its protocols for public-safety outages: pre-recorded telephone notice to
the general population, specialized supplemental alerts for medical
baseline and life support customers, and text alerts to those with hearing
disabilities.157 The CPUC does not mandate that all other IOUs follow
SDG&E protocols because power shutoffs are often reactive and occur
when a utility anticipates immediate threats to its electrical
infrastructure.158 Instead, the CPUC encourages alert prioritization to

149. Id. at 1, 5-9.
150. See id. at 5.
151. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 119.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 32; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 9; but see CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399,
399.2(c) (2001).
154. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 8-9.
158. Id. at 8.
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critical service providers (schools, hospitals, prisons, public safety
agencies, telecommunications utilities, and water districts) and
populations most vulnerable to power shutoffs—customers relying on
power to stay alive.159
Second, when possible, an IOU must notify the Safety and
Enforcement Division before a de-energization occurs.160 This change
varies from SDG&E guidelines mandating the notification of the
Director of CPSD (now SED) within twelve hours before it shuts off
power.161 SED reporting is not at issue here; rather, the concern lies with
de-energization impacts on vulnerable communities overall. For
working families with few affordable alternative sources of energy
required for day-to-day needs, de-energization results in lost wages and
spoiled food.162 For the medically vulnerable, de-energization escalates
to a life and death situation where breathing machines can no longer
function, and life saving medication cannot be properly preserved.163
For non-English speakers, alerts limited to only a few languages leave
particular communities without critical information.164 Notification
prioritization addresses few of the significant impacts that widespread
de-energization inflicts on poorer populations.165
2. Reporting
ESRB-8 requires IOUs to report their de-energization action plans
to state regulators.166 Originally, PSPS reporting standards applied only
to SDG&E.167 The CPUC now requires all IOUs to follow SDG&E
reporting mandates.168
All electric IOUs must submit a report to the Director of SED
within ten days after each de-energization event, including notifications
to local governments and customers—even when no power shutoff
occurs.169 This report must detail at a minimum: (i) the date of contact
to affected community representatives; (ii) classification of zones
according to General Order 95; (iii) an explanation if unable to provide
159. Id. at 10.
160. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6.
161. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36.
162. Jackie Botts, “We need the food that we lost.” Low-income families still reeling from
blackouts, CALMATTERS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://calmatters.org/projects/california-pspspower-shutoffs-poverty-spoiled-food-hunger/.
163. Gregory, supra note 146.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5-9.
167. Id. at 5.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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notification to affected customers at least two hours before any deenergization event; (iv) a summary of filed complaints against the IOU
because of shutoffs; (v) a detailed description of steps taken to restore
power, and; (vi) identify by address each community assistance location
during the shutoff event as well as days and hours of operation.170
In turn, Order 12-04-24 directs SDG&E to notify the CPSD within
twelve hours after shutting off power.171 Upon conclusion of the event,
the utility must submit a comprehensive report detailing information
leading up to, during, and following the event.172 The report must
provide: (i) “an explanation of SDG&E’s decision to shut off power;”
(ii) all factors considered, including wind speeds, temperatures,
humidity levels, and vegetation moisture near de-energized circuits; (iii)
the time, locations, and duration of the power shutoff; (iv) number of
affected customers according to residential, medical baseline,
commercial/industrial, and other; (v) any wind-related damage to
SDG&E power lines in de-energized areas; (vi) a description of notice
to customers and mitigation efforts, and; (vii) any other matters SDG&E
believes relevant in assessing whether its decision to shut off the power
was reasonable.173 ESRB-8 extends similar reporting requirements to all
IOUs.174
Excluded from IOU reporting: de-energization impacts on
economically vulnerable households. Neither Decision 12-04-042 for
SDG&E, ESRB-8 as applied to all IOUs, nor Decision 19-05-042
mandate detailed analysis into the extent to which poor communities
stand impacted from de-energization.175 Reporting requirements
emphasize notification, language-tailored alerts, geographical and
cultural demographics of affected areas, strategies for in-person
warnings, and coordination efforts with local and state agencies.176 Yet,
without including de-energization impacts on economically vulnerable
households, current CPUC de-energization reviews risk overlooking
critical inquires into whether de-energization raises other substantial
public safety issues.177 Likewise, for utilities, not incorporating
economic impacts on low-income households into their mandated
170. Id.
171. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 36.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 36-37.
174. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 5.
175. CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16, at 22-32 (requiring all IOUs to utilize all
reasonable communications channels to reach all populations potentially impacted by power
shutoff events). See also CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 116-131; CPUC
DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 9-11, 34-37; ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6-7.
176. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 126-127.
177. See Gregory, supra note 146.
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reports prevents full appreciation of the broader consequences following
from power shutoff execution.
3. Mitigation Efforts
Along with notification and reporting, an IOU must highlight
mitigation efforts taken during and after a de-energization event.178
Mitigation can include local outreach through workshops addressing
notification needs in affected communities—especially those with
prevalent language barriers, disabilities, and elderly populations.179 The
effectiveness of outreach depends on whether community concerns
influence de-energization plans.
De-energization requirements focus on notification to communities
affected by de-energization; mitigation largely remains under IOU
discretion.180 To the CPUC, the importance lies with identifying,
educating, and notifying vulnerable populations to ensure maximized
resiliency during and following planned power shutoffs.181
4. CPUC Reasonableness Review
The CPUC possesses broad rulemaking authority over all public
utilities falling within its jurisdiction.182 When it comes to deenergization, the CPUC specifically retains the power of review: the
Commission can inquire into whether a utility reasonably de-energized
its infrastructure based on the dangerous weather and fire conditions at
the time of shutoff.183 Yet, the Commission stops short of embracing a
strict reasonableness test.184 Instead, IOUs are expected to employ their
best judgment on a case-by-case basis when executing power shutoffs.185
Utilities can de-energize when confronting heightened wildfire
threats.186 Certainly, emergencies warrant granting IOUs flexible
178. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 6-7.
179. Id. at 6. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16.
180. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 116-19.
181. See id. at 117.
182. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
183. CPUC DECISION 12-04-024, supra note 16, at 35.
184. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123.
185. ESRB-8, supra note 16, at 4, 8 (“[The IOU] must reasonably believe that there is an
imminent and significant risk that strong winds will topple its power lines onto tinder dry
vegetation or will cause major vegetation-related impacts on its facilities during periods of
extreme fire hazard.”).
186. Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) / De-Energization, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/deenergization/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2021) (“In 2012, the CPUC
ruled that California Public Utilities Code Sections 451 and 399.2(a) give electric utilities
authority to shut off electric power in order to protect public safety. This allows energy
companies (SDG&E, PG&E, SCE, Liberty, Bear Valley and PacifiCorp) to shut off power for
the prevention of fires where strong winds, heat events, and related conditions are present.”).
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authority over de-energization action plans. But the absence of a
streamlined reasonableness standard focused on evaluating the integrity
of utility infrastructure encourages PSPS becoming a general wildfire
response rather than a tool of last resort. Without inquiring into whether
a de-energizing utility remains committed to infrastructure repairs and
maintenance, the CPUC leaves out critical information in its
reasonableness review.
The CPUC already evaluates utility investment proposals and
requests for increasing customer electric rates through its General Rate
Case (GRC) proceedings.187 In December 2020, the CPUC approved
PG&E rate increases for customers through the GRC process.188 PG&E
cites the GRC rate increase as a:
[N]ecessary investment in PG&E’s electric and gas distribution
systems . . . including investments to reduce the risk of catastrophic
wildfires through electric system hardening, enhanced vegetation
management, system automation, and asset inspection and repair.
The GRC also enables PG&E to continue its efforts to make Public
Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events smaller in size, shorter in
duration and smarter in execution.189

But for PG&E, its objectives of electric system hardening and reducing
PSPS execution requires a more assertive CPUC role to ensure the utility
adheres to those commitments. Without an ongoing de-energization
reasonableness review centered on utility infrastructure integrity, the
utilities have an open door to forgo their infrastructure maintenance
obligations, deviate from compliance with safe and reliable power
mandates, and transform PSPS into a general wildfire response to stave
off liability.190 The reality for financially distressed utilities like PG&E
187. Electric
Rates,
CAL.
PUB.
UTILS.
COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/electricrates/#:~:text=The%20CPUC%20must%20approve*%20al
l,CPUC%20proceedings%20called%20ratemaking%20proceedings (last visited Mar. 10,
2021). PG&E Receives State Approval for Investments Aimed at Improving Safety, Reducing
Wildfire Risk and Building a Stronger Energy System for the Future, PG&E,
https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20201203_pge_rece
ives_state_approval_for_investments_aimed_at_improving_safety_reducing_wildfire_risk_
and_building_a_stronger_energy_system_for_the_future (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
188. PG&E GRC Rate Approval, supra note 147 (“With the CPUC approval of the
settlement agreement, the average monthly bill for a typical residential electric and gas
customer will increase by $13.44 a month. This includes $10.40 for electric and $3.05 for gas
service. The 2020 GRC rate change . . . will be effective March 1, 2021 and will impact rates
until Dec. 31, 2022.”).
189. Id.
190. See CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 68 (stating that under no
circumstances may a utility execute de-energization as a sole response to ward off liability).
See also CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977) (promoting public safety); CAL. PUB. UTILS.
CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c) (2001) (reasonable infrastructure investments) (safe and reliable
operation).
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leaves PSPS as the general wildfire response because its vastly
deteriorating infrastructure threatens public safety, but its projected
system hardening extends for the next twelve to fourteen years.191
III. IDENTIFICATION OF LEGAL PROBLEMS: DE-ENERGIZATION
UNDERCUTS STATUTORY DIRECTIVES TO PROVIDE SAFE AND
RELIABLE SERVICE
California faces an increasingly dangerous situation directly
connected to an aging electrical infrastructure.192 To meet these dangers,
de-energization can serve as a useful tool of last resort when IOUs
respond to weather conditions imminently threatening safe delivery of
power.193
Nevertheless, unfettered de-energization discretion opens a
dangerous door for utility abuse. Such authority acutely endangers the
public in the midst of the current pandemic crisis—a crisis where
millions of households rely on safe and reliable power for information
access, maintenance of life-saving equipment and medication,
telemedicine, emergency communications, storage of expensive food,
virtual learning, and work-from-home.194 In the case of PG&E, its
financial situation, past criminal implications, decaying infrastructure,
and widespread power shutoffs exemplify the dangers of permitting a
utility with a poor safety track record to unilaterally de-energize without
evaluating the integrity of its electrical system through a CPUC
reasonableness review.195
As a consequence, without sufficient CPUC oversight, broad IOU
de-energization raises three specific concerns: (1) PSPS authority
undermines adherence with investment duties under PU Codes 451, 399,
and 399.2; (2) PSPS execution and potential access to a new wildfire
fund incentivize utilities to side-step critical repairs to their electric
facilities—investments integral to safe and reliable power; and (3) PSPS
authority disproportionately impacts socially and economically
vulnerable communities—communities devastated by the current
coronavirus pandemic.

191. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 3, 7 (reporting that PG&E
completed system hardening of overhead distribution lines in High Fire Threat Districts for
171 miles, plans to target 241 miles in 2020, and completing a total of 7,100 miles of
hardening over the next twelve to fourteen years).
192. Cagle, supra note 8.
193. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123.
194. See JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27, at 2-3.
195. Gregory, supra note 146.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Broad De-Energization Authority Undermines PU Codes § 451, §
399, and § 399.2
PU Code 451 mandates utilities to deliver just and reasonable
electrical power as necessary to promote public safety.196 PU Code 399
reinforces public safety by directing prudent investments in utility
electrical systems, and a competent and adequately sized workforce.197
PU Code 399.2 then lays further responsibility on IOUs to operate
facilities in a safe and reliable manner.198 Collectively, these provisions
demand electrical corporations furnish safe and reliable power by
maintaining a trained and sized workforce, operating in a safe and
reliable manner and prudently investing in utility-owned electrical
infrastructure.199
In October of 2019, PG&E cut power to nearly three million
people.200 Yet, PG&E projects its de-energization program will continue
for the next five years.201 Nevertheless, extreme conditions cannot
overshadow years of inadequate PG&E recordkeeping regarding the age,
composition, and degree of wear concerning its electrical infrastructure
system.202 The Butte County Report details how investigations into the
PG&E San Bruno Gas Explosion and the Camp Fire revealed an
alarming shared characteristic: “PG&E never made an effort to examine,
evaluate and catalogue the components of those lines.”203 As the Butte
Report highlights regarding the Camp Fire:
In a written response to a CPUC data request PG&E states “PG&E
has not historically maintained an inventory of suspension hooks or
their manufacturers, age or material composition. As a result, PG&E
does not have an inventory of all transmission and distribution
facilities in the entire PG&E service territory organized by location
and the presence of suspension hooks similar to the Incident
Location 1 suspension hook.”204

196. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977).
197. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399 (2001).
198. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
199. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
200. Newburger, supra note 3.
201. Senate Committee Wildfire Hearing, supra note 6, at 1:01:00 (statement by PG&E
CEO William “Bill” Johnson) (“I think for us, in Northern California, it will take us probably
five years to get to the point where we can largely eliminate this tool.”). UPDATED 2020 WMP
REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-2.
202. See CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66 n.124.
203. Id. at 66.
204. Id. at 66 n.124.

684

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

Consider the magnitude of PG&E not maintaining an account of the age
and composition of its electrical system: PG&E service territory
encompasses more than 50,000 steel transmission structures, 100,000
non-steel transmission structures, and more than two million distribution
poles.205 Yet, PG&E acknowledges it has not “historically” tracked the
age, composition, and degree of wear of such an expansive electrical
system.206 Evidentiary findings into the Camp Fire revealed the fire
resulted from excessive wear of an approximately 100-year-old “Chook” responsible for holding up an insulator assembly attached to a
tower, and used for supporting electrified power lines.207 When
questioned about similar wear identified in another tower along with
evidence of repairs made to that tower, PG&E asserted it had “no records
of when or why this work was done.”208
PG&E electrical infrastructure services over 16 million customers
across 70,000 square miles spanning the Bay Area, Northern and Central
California—customers relying on the utility to reinforce its facilities.209
Failure to maintain records of the age, composition, and other critical
information regarding infrastructure equipment translates into blindly
operating decaying electrical infrastructure endangering the public.
California faces a dire situation where public safety depends on private
decisions to adequately repair utility-owned electrical systems and to
maintain records of its facilities.210 PG&E admits it cannot guarantee
the safety of its electric lines by pointing to an inadequate supply of
trained personal for its failure to implement widespread inspections and
repairs of its electrical lines.211 Simply stated, PG&E cannot guarantee
it will follow the law.
Here, broad de-energization discretion threatens noncompliance
with utility duties to promote public safety, to safely and reliably operate
electrical systems, and to reasonably invest in utility-owned
infrastructure by instead incentivizing power shutoffs as the method of
addressing wildfire dangers.212 De-energization presents an attractive
option for the utility: it can proactively execute power shutoffs during
emergencies—emergencies created by its own failures to adequately
replace decaying facilities and maintain a sizeable workforce—as its
method of delaying repairs. In such a situation, de-energization proves
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id. at 19-20, 66 n.124.
Id. at 2-3, 19-22. See also Cagle, supra note 8.
CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 21.
Trageser, supra note 98.
Cagle, supra note 8.
See PG&E 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN, supra note 128, at 55.
Cagle, supra note 8.
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disastrous to public safety by manipulating a narrowly tailored tool
intended for dangerous weather conditions into a broad instrument
circumventing utility duties.213
B. De-Energization and New Wildfire Fund Incentivize Sidestepping
Expensive, but Critical Infrastructure Repairs
PU Code 399.2 outlines two general IOU investment duties:
399.2(a) directs electrical corporations to operate their electrical
infrastructure in a safe and reliable manner while 399.2(c) directs
prudent investments in utility-owned electrical infrastructure.214 IOUs
operate via a cost-benefit analysis in which grid safety coincides with
affordable prices—a calculus complicated by climate change.215 But a
recently enacted wildfire fund emboldens electric utilities to sidestep
their investment duties and endanger the lives of customers, employees
and the public.
In 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law Assembly Bill
1054 (the Wildfire Fund), allowing electrical corporations to recover just
and reasonable costs resulting from a catastrophic wildfire if the utility
acted reasonably under the circumstances.216 Specifically, the CPUC
must determine whether:
[A]n electrical corporation’s conduct was reasonable if that conduct,
related to the ignition, was consistent with action that a reasonable
utility would have undertaken in good
faith
under
similar
circumstances, at the relevant point in time, and based on the
information available to the electrical corporation at the time, as
provided.217

AB 1054 imposes the initial burden of reasonableness on the utility.218
The electrical corporation must demonstrate its reasonable conduct by a
preponderance of evidence—unless the utility possesses a valid safety
certification during the fund application time period, in which holding a
certificate presumes reasonable conduct unless serious doubt is raised.219
213. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001); see also CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 123.
214. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
215. Cagle, supra note 8 (“Utilities are motivated to keep their grid as safe as they can for
the price they can afford, according to a risk model that’s been upended by climate change.
New fire risks may present a new crisis to power utilities, but so long as they manage their
liabilities within the ‘prudent’ buffer, there’s little incentive to change course.”). See generally
Ghadessi & Zafar, supra note 70, at 3 (“Investors expect to earn a return on their capital.”).
216. Wildfire Fund and Safety Certificates, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/safetycertificates/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
217. Assem. B. 1054, 2019-2020 (Cal. 2020) (Legislative Counsel’s Digest).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Reasonable conduct “encompasses a spectrum of possible practices,
methods, or acts consistent with utility system needs,” ratepayer
interests, and regulator requirements.220
To qualify for safety certification—and establish a presumption of
reasonable conduct—a utility must meet the mandates under PU Code
8389(e).221 Safety certification requirements include a utility providing
documentation of: (1) an approved Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP); (2)
good standing; (3) an established safety committee board; (4) an
executive compensation plan “structured to promote safety as a
priority;” (5) executive-level reporting to the CPUC; (6) executive
officer compensation tied to an electrical corporation’s long-term
performance and value; and (7) implementation of its approved WMP.222
Certification shall issue to the utility upon satisfaction of the
requirements.223 On January 14, 2021, PG&E officially received its
Wildfire Safety Certification—joining SDG&E and SCE—despite an
ongoing Cal Fire investigation into whether PG&E equipment may be
responsible for the Zogg Fire, which killed four people.224
At one end, the fund pools critical funds for utilities to access and
pay out wildfire victims. Under California law, IOUs and their
customers remain liable for covering property damages connected to
fires sparked by utility equipment.225 Pooling liability dollars into a
centralized wildfire fund helps alleviate this imposed legal
responsibility.226 Yet, the Wildfire Fund provides a dual layer of
protection for utilities—such as PG&E—where de-energization may
substitute for electrical facility investments, workforce, and operations;
at the same time, a utility can access an expansive wildfire liability fund
tantamount to a bailout.227 With a customer base of sixteen million, the
220. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451.1 (1977).
221. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 8389(e)(1)-(7) (2020).
222. Id.
223. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 8389(e) (2020).
224. Letter from Caroline T. Jacobs, Dir., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Wildfire Safety Div.,
to Robert Kenney, PG&E Vice President of Reg. Affairs (Jan. 14, 2021) (on file with the
California Public Utilities Commission). See also Jaxon Van Derbeken, Judge Presses PG&E
for Zogg Fire Answers, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 18, 2021, 8:20 PM),
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/judge-presses-pge-for-zogg-fireanswers/2471868/.
225. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (requiring just compensation for private property taken for
public use). See also Barham v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 753 (1999) (holding
private utilities could be held liable as a public entity subject to California Constitution Article
1, Section 19).
226. See CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 19.
227. See George Skelton, With new California wildfire law, Newsom didn’t let perfect be
the
enemy
of
good,
L.A.
TIMES
(July
18,
2019,
12:05
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-07-17/skelton-gavin-newsom-californiawildfire-legislation.
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Wildfire Fund reflects state legislature judgments holding PG&E
remains “too big to fail” because it powers nearly forty percent of
California, and the goal of keeping large utilities in service by softening
wildfire liability costs.228
Nevertheless, the law raises two critical inquiries: (1) whether the
CPUC retains reasonableness review over utility access to this new
wildfire fund and; (2) whether failure to reasonably invest in owned
infrastructure outlined by PU Code 399.2 falls into the reasonable deenergization calculus.229
The CPUC has yet to address these inquiries, and current decisions
do not incorporate 399.2(c) infrastructure investments into the deenergization reasonableness review.230 For PG&E, de-energization and
potential wildfire fund access diminish incentives to promptly repair its
electrical facilities—infrastructure responsible for significant loss of life
and property.231 Following PG&E’s unprecedented power shutoff to
millions of customers, the CPUC publicly notified its intent to
investigate the utility for PSPS compliance.232 The investigation aims to
evaluate all IOU PSPS action plans and ensure de-energization remains
a tool of last resort.233 For PG&E, the CPUC is investigating whether
the utility should be sanctioned for violating PU Code 451, Decision 1905-042, and Resolution ESRB-8, in connection with its widespread deenergization communication mishandling, failure to alert customers, and
coordination breakdowns with local governments during the October
2019 de-energization blackout.234 Yet, the 2020 SED Report on the 2019
Public Safety Power Shutoff Events did not inquire into the integrity of
PG&E infrastructure, PU Code 399.2 utility infrastructure investment
mandates, nor PG&E’s potential access to the Wildfire Fund, but does
reinforce the need for additional de-energization notification
requirements.235

228. See id.
229. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451.1(b) (1977).
230. See generally CPUC DECISION 20-05-051, supra note 16; CPUC DECISION 19-05042, supra note 35; ESRB-8, supra note 16.
231. See Trageser, supra note 98.
232. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, CPUC Takes Additional Decisive Actions to
Hold Utilities Accountable and Increase Public Safety (Oct. 28, 2019),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M318/K885/318885370.PDF.
233. See CPUC to Examine Recent Utility PSPS Events, supra note 107, at 2.
234. See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER AND
ASSIGNED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S RULING DIRECTING PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC
COMPANY TO SHOW CAUSE WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED BY THE COMMISSION
FOR VIOLATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTIONS 451 COMMISSION DECISION 19-05042 AND RESOLUTION ESRB-8, at 1 (Nov. 11, 2019).
235. See SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 83-87.
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Climate change heightens wildfire dangers and complicates
mitigation efforts for utilities and the public as the climate becomes drier
and hotter, temperatures experience extreme swings between hot and
cold, and drought and flood change the topography. Drought-like
conditions increase dry vegetation growing alongside electrical lines,
and excessive winds present the danger of ignition even when vegetation
management requirements are observed.236 For PG&E, its service
territory encompasses widespread electrical poles, lines, and facilities
near extensive tree populations and brush.237 Addressing these risks
requires deploying numerous workers and equipment, all impacting a
financial bottom line.238
While climate change poses new risks, utilities have an ongoing
duty to provide safe and reliable service adapted to current conditions.
Negligent maintenance of electrical infrastructure elevates safety risks
because faulty or old facilities are ill adept at withstanding extreme
weather conditions.239 Excessively aged power poles cannot withstand
high winds—a lesson learned from the fatal Camp Fire.240 Facilities
must also withstand sustained winds:
High winds or sustained winds may induce metal on metal rub and
create dangerous conditions including conductor splice failures or
wear on fasteners, hardware, and other equipment that can ignite
fires.241 The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) found
that “higher sustained winds are more likely to cause motion in nontensioned lines and hardware, such as jumpers.”242

Operating infrastructure beyond the anticipated useful life stands
inconsistent with the delivery of safe and reliable power. Yet, IOUs can
practically sidestep necessary repairs to electrical infrastructure by
instead shutting off power when fire hazards acutely threaten the very
facilities utilities are charged with maintaining.243 Despite viable duty
breaches under CPUC regulations, extensive wildfire liability,

236. See Cagle, supra note 8.
237. See Worth & Pinchin, supra note 141.
238. See id.
239. See Newburger, supra note 3.
240. See Cagle, supra note 8.
241. Amici Comments in Opposition to the Probation Conditions Suggested by PG&E,
The Federal Monitor, and the U.S. Dep’t of Just. at 17, United States v. PG&E, No. 14-cr00175, 2016 WL 1298388 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2016) (No. CR 14-0175 WHA).
242. Id. (quoting CPUC, APPENDIX A SED INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR 2018
CAMP
FIRE
WITH
ATTACHMENTS
48
(Nov.
8,
2019),
ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/News_and_Outreach/I1906015%20Appendix%20A%20SED%20Camp
%20Fire%20Investigation%20Report%20REDACTED.pdf).
243. See id. at 18.
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deteriorating infrastructure, and operations risking public safety, PG&E
submitted its Safety Certification Request but has yet to receive one.244
C. De-Energization Disproportionately Impacts Socially and
Economically Vulnerable Communities
Currently, ratepayers have few options for purchasing their
electricity.245 Even if an electrical customer chooses a different retailer
to serve its electrical needs, a competitive retailer—whether owned by a
municipality or privately controlled—depends on PG&E electric
distribution and transmission lines to transfer power to the electric
retailer end-use customer.246 When electrical utilities de-energize their
lines, socially and economically sensitive communities stand acutely
vulnerable to power disruptions.247 The CPUC remains aware of this
threat.248 The Commission places emphasis on notification and
mitigation efforts but falls short of analyzing specific impacts affecting
these communities during prolonged de-energization events.249 Order
19-05-042 identifies vulnerable communities as populations with access
and functional needs (AFN),250 but those bearing the full force of deenergization blackouts include medical baseline customers, poor
communities, and households with undocumented member.251 The

244. Wildfire Fund and Safety Certificates, supra note 216 (“A safety certification allows
an electrical corporation to recover catastrophic wildfire costs from its ratepayers, or from the
Wildfire Insurance Fund, if applicable, using a burden of proof test that is easier to satisfy
than would be the case if [the corporation] did not have a safety certification. To obtain a
safety certification, the electrical corporation must satisfy the conditions of Public Utilities
Code Section 8389(e)(1-7).”). See generally Jaxon Van Derbeken, PG&E Critics Welcome
Regulators’ New Stance, NBC BAY AREA (Nov. 25, 2020, 7:12 PM),
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/pge-critics-welcome-regulators-newstance/2408525/ (sharing comments by Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Santa Clara Law Professor
and former CPUC Commissioner, on the CPUC warning PG&E how its prior safety record
could jeopardize its 2020 Safety Certification) (“This is a good step . . . I have become very
concerned over the years that PG&E is not learning the lessons from its failures, and is not
implementing them.”).
245. Cagle, supra note 8.
246. See Gregory, supra note 146.
247. Id.
248. CPUC DECISION 19-05-042, supra note 35, at 7 (“[D]e-energization can leave
communities and essential facilities without power, which brings its own risks and hardships,
particularly for vulnerable communities and individuals.”).
249. Id. at 83.
250. Id. at 78 (citing CAL. GOV. CODE § 8593.3 (2021)) (“[T]he access and functional
needs population consists of individuals who have . . . intellectual disabilities, physical
disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English
speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are
low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those
who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.”).
251. Botts, supra note 162.
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current global pandemic further intensifies de-energization dangers
already affecting these same populations.252
1. Medically Vulnerable Populations
For the medically vulnerable, repeated prolonged power shutoffs
endanger individuals dependent on electricity to stay alive.253 When
utilities de-energize power, individuals with dependent on life-saving
equipment face a life and death situation.254 Replacing insulin is costly
and time-consuming and may require interaction with the public that
increases the risk of exposure to COVID-19.255 Many breathing
machines can lack backup batteries or have batteries capable of only a
few hours of operation.256 The 2019 PG&E blackouts spanned several
days in many areas.257 At the same time, PG&E’s advanced notification
and community outreach failed to mitigate widespread de-energization
hardships experienced across several counties affecting millions of
people.258 With PG&E projecting expansive de-energization for the next
five years, medically vulnerable populations remain at risk until the
utility fundamentally strengthens its decaying infrastructure.259
2. Economically Distressed Communities
For poor communities, de-energization leaves few alternatives for
meeting household energy needs. Generators are expensive and require
constant steady sources of fuel for continued operation.260 Diesel
generators—for those able to afford them—exacerbate air pollution and
“produce ‘black carbon’ emissions and fine particulates including
particulate matter 2.5 (PM 2.5) which induce climate change and ill-

252. JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27, at 17-21.
253. Sotolongo et al., supra note 2, at 5.
254. See id.
255. Are You Prepared in the Event of a Power Outage?, STANISLAUS COUNTY,
http://www.schsa.org/publichealth/pages/power-outage/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021)
[hereinafter Power Outage]. See also S. Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Insulin in the
United States: An Urgent Call to Action, MAYO CLINIC PROC. (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(19)31008-0/fulltext (providing
an example of a price increase of 1000%, from $21 to $332, for one vial of insulin).
256. See Power Outage, supra note 255.
257. Id.
258. See CPUC Letter to PG&E, supra note 3, at 1.
259. Ethan Howland & Paul Ciampoli, PG&E CEO sees power shutoffs continuing for
five
years,
A M.
PUB.
POWER
ASS’N
(Jan.
2,
2020),
https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/pge-ceo-sees-power-shutoffs-continuingfive-years.
260. Roy Berendsohn, How to Safely Use a Home Generator, POPULAR MECHANICS
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.popularmechanics.com/adventure/reviews/a11855/homegenerator-101-how-to-power-on-when-the-power-goes-out/.
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health.”261 Exposure to black-carbon and particulates may increase
asthma and compromise lung health—conditions making people more
vulnerable to poor COVID-19 outcomes.262
Moreover, power shutoffs disproportionally impact working and
impoverished families as electricity loss results in spoiled food that can
be difficult and costly for these families to replace.263 School shutdowns
eliminate daily access to price reduced or free lunches—a staple food
source for many low-income households as high numbers of families and
individuals seek aid from local community food banks.264 Additionally,
de-energization may result in lost days of work, in turn reducing earnings
and further constraining budgets for low-income residents.265 For these
populations, advanced de-energization notifications do not change the
economic circumstances. Instead, power shutoff events further dislocate
economically sensitive communities by interrupting the power necessary
for day-to-day functions.
3. Non-Citizen and Undocumented Community Members
For undocumented community members, de-energization imperils
lives by dissuading requests for government help and limiting access to
public assistance because of citizenship status.266 Many undocumented
individuals refrain from seeking public aid out of fear local, state, or
federal government workers may communicate their immigration status
to the federal government.267 Those specifically affected include
immigrant families, immigrants with disabilities, and immigrants fleeing
from violence, including those because of their LGBTQ identification—
populations heavily reliant on some form of assistance during
261. Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Energy Access is Energy Justice: The Yurok Tribe’s
Trailblazing Work to Close the Native American Reservation Electricity Gap, in ENERGY
JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 7 (Raya Salter, Carmen G. Gonzalez,
Michael H. Dworkin, Roxanna A. Mastor, Elizabeth Kronk Warner, eds. 2018).
262. See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/peoplewith-medicalconditions.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F20
19-ncov%2Fneed-extra-precautions%2Fgroups-at-higher-risk.html (updated Dec. 29, 2020)
(listing conditions which may increase risk of severe illness from COVID-19 including
asthma (moderate-to-severe) and pulmonary fibrosis (having damaged or scarred lung
tissues)).
263. Botts, supra note 162.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Natalie Hanson, Public Charge Rule Would End Benefits for Immigrants Withouth
Green
Card,
CHICO-ENTERPRISE-RECORD
(Oct.
22,
2019,
3:30
AM),
https://www.chicoer.com/2019/10/22/public-charge-rule-would-end-benefits-forimmigrants-without-green-card/.
267. Id.
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widespread de-energization events.268 Aid eligibility restrictions leaves
these vulnerable communities without sufficient resources to endure a
prolonged blackout.269
Those seeking citizenship face similar dangers. Under the new
public charge rule implemented by the Trump Administration, the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services must consider:
[T]he receipt of certain cash and non-cash public benefits, including
those that may be used to obtain testing or treatment for COVID-19
in a public charge inadmissibility determination, and for purposes of
a public benefit condition applicable to certain nonimmigrants
seeking an extension of stay or change of status.270

The Rule specifically conditions the approval of nonimmigrant visa
holders seeking to extend their stay or change their nonimmigrant
classification status on not receiving public benefits for more than twelve
months—in total—within any thirty-six month period.271 Included in
those public benefits determinations are most federally funded Medicaid
programs, and cash and noncash benefits used to obtain COVID-19
testing or treatment.272
In January 2020, the Supreme Court in Department of Homeland
Security v. New York,273 granted DHS a stay for a preliminary injunction
issued against the new rule change pending resolution on the merits in
the Second Circuit.274 In September 2020, the Second Circuit in New
York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,275 stayed the injunction
based on DHS demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits of
irreparable harm by not being able to enforce the change; but the Ninth
Circuit in City & County of San Francisco v. USCIS,276 largely affirmed
268. Id.
269. Natalie Hanson, Immigrants In Butte County Affected By New Public Charge Rule,
CHICO-ENTERPRISE-RECORD
(Dec.
15,
2019,
2:32
AM),
https://www.chicoer.com/2019/12/15/immigrants-in-butte-county-affected-by-new-publiccharge-rule/.
270. Public Charge, supra note 28 (expanding public charge rule to include aliens who
have received public benefits for more than twelve months within any thirty-six-month
period).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (granting DHS a stay
on a preliminary injunction issued against the new rule change pending disposition of
government’s appeal in the Second Circuit).
274. Id.
275. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2020) (staying
injunction based on DHS showing likelihood of success on the merits of irreparable harm).
276. City & Cty. of S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 981 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.
2020) (affirming injunctions issued for plaintiffs grounded on showing the likelihood of
success on the merits of irreparable harm based on new change, but vacating the nationwide
applicability).
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preliminary injunctions issued against the rule, although it vacated
nationwide applicability.277 Following the 2020 Presidential Election,
the USCIS under the Biden Administration announced it would no
longer adhere to the 2019 Public Charge Rule changes, nor would the
Department of Justice seek appellate review of judicial decisions
invalidating or enjoining its enforcement.278 But the consequences for
non-citizen immigrant community members remain clear: public charge
considerations dissuade seeking local, state, and federal help following
a wildfire or de-energization event out of fear doing so will lead to
deportation or other citizenship application consequences.
For households with undocumented immigrants, the electricity loss
and the COVID-19 crisis force a choice between two dangerous options:
either ride the power shutoff out for however long it may last and risk
individual health and safety should illness or complications develop, or
risk legal sanctions, deportation and safety by leaving home and
exposing oneself to other infected individuals. Dangers are further
escalated by fire threats that force undocumented family members to
evacuate their homes—even when they have no place to go—and risk
deportation when staying at public shelters.
De-energization notification, education, and community outreach
alone cannot overcome acute economic conditions vulnerable
communities face when widespread power shutoffs repeatedly
compromise reliance on safe and reliable power.279 Utilities must
comply with CPUC mandates to maintain their electrical infrastructure;
to do otherwise circumvents their legal obligations of delivering safe and
reliable power to those communities in most need.280 Cognizant of these
widespread dangers, this analysis offers a specific recommendation
falling within CPUC authority for decisive implementation in reducing
de-energization as a general wildfire response.
V. PROPOSAL
The California Constitution vests the CPUC with vast regulatory
authority over all utilities generating, transmitting, or furnishing power
“directly or indirectly to or for the public.”281 Under this delegation, the
Commission can “establish rules, examine records, issue subpoenas [sic]
277. Compare New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 974 F.3d, with City & Cty. of
S.F. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 981 F.3d at 763.
278. USCIS, Letter to Interagency Partners (2021).
279. See generally ESRB-8, supra note 16.
280. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451 (1977); CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2(c)
(2001).
281. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
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. . . and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public utilities
subject to its jurisdiction.”282 At the same time, the CPUC has exercised
its power in interpreting PU Codes 451 and 399.2 as granting IOUs deenergization discretion while reserving for itself the power of review.283
To ensure utilities remain committed to their legal duties of
promoting public safety, prudent infrastructure investments, and
delivering safe and reliable power to the public, the CPUC must evaluate
utility infrastructure investments when conducting de-energization
reasonableness reviews. In line with its broad regulatory power, this
analysis recommends the CPUC take a two-fold approach: (1)
investigate utility compliance with the duty to invest in their electrical
infrastructure (an infrastructure investment inquiry) and; (2) factor this
investment inquiry into the utility de-energization reasonableness
review. The CPUC touts IOU discretion as a vital tool for addressing
emergencies, but for utilities like PG&E, unfettered de-energization
discretion threatens to become a general wildfire response amidst the
current public health crisis and a looming 2021 Wildfire Season.284
A. The CPUC Must Incorporate an Infrastructure Investment Inquiry
into its Reasonableness Review
First, the CPUC must inquire into whether de-energization
accompanies diligent electrical infrastructure investments. Duties under
PU Code 399.2 are threefold: 399.2(a) reiterates delivery of safe and
reliable power while holding electrical corporations responsible for
controlling, managing, operating, and maintaining owned distribution
lines; 399.2(b) mandates compliance with PU 330; 399.2(c) directs
reasonable investments in owned electrical infrastructure.285
Reasonable investments in infrastructure are not mere
recommendations—they are the law. As an example, SDG&E has
focused on its infrastructure investments along with reducing the scope
of its de-energization events.286 Yet, PG&E has expanded de282. Id. § 6.
283. CPUC DECISION 09-09-030, supra note 48, at 61-62.
284. See generally JOINT MOTION FOR EMERGENCY ORDER, supra note 27.
285. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
286. Trageser, supra note 98 (“In the past decade an SDG&E spokesperson said [SDG&E]
has spent more than $1.5 billion on wildfire preparedness . . . [overhauling] its grid to
minimize large scale power shutoffs . . . rolling out new technology . . . including moving
power lines underground and creating smaller grids so they can turn off power in
neighborhoods or even individual households with the highest fire risk.”). See also CPUC
Letter to SDG&E, supra note 17 (“While San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) is often held
up as a model for wildfire mitigation and has been able to develop a number of tools to
minimize the impact of PSPS, SDG&E should seek to improve and learn from other utilities’
experiences. SDG&E should carefully assess and consider the CPUC’s directions to PG&E
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energization while undergoing bankruptcy proceedings.287 In October
2018, the utility cut power to 60,000 customers across six counties;
contrast this to October 2019 when the utility shut off power to nearly
two million customers.288 By requiring investment disclosures in deenergization reports, the CPUC can evaluate whether utilities exercising
power shutoffs remain committed to reasonable investment mandates
under PU Code 399.2.289
B. Public Safety Demands a More Assertive CPUC Approach over DeEnergization Events
Second, safe delivery of reliable power relies on critical
investments in IOU-owned facilities.290 Consequently, any CPUC
reasonableness review into de-energization necessitates evaluating
whether power-shutoffs remain tools of last resort—not general wildfire
responses.291 Safe, reliable power cannot exist without diligent
investments in electrical facilities, and moving electricity via faulty or
excessively outdated transmission and distribution lines cannot
constitute safe delivery of such power.
Expansive recurring power shutoffs divorced from fundamental
upgrades to aging infrastructure fail as reasonable exercises of deenergization authority. The devastating 2018 Camp Fire vividly
illustrates the dangers of operating electrical facilities well beyond age
limits.292 In 2007, SDG&E similarly confronted the loss of life when
utility power lines destroyed hundreds of homes and killed two
people.293 As a result, the utility streamlined its de-energization efforts,
implemented new technology, and relocated power lines underground.294
But PG&E’s 2020 Wildfire Mitigation Plan limits system hardening
strengthening to 241 miles and 7,100 miles over the next twelve to
fourteen years even when PG&E service territory encompasses 5,500
and examine last week’s . . . [October 7, 2019, massive PG&E power shutoffs] to ensure
critical lessons learned are transferred to SDG&E’s operation and that there is not a repeat of
any of last week’s mistakes in any part of the state in the future.”).
287. PG&E 2019 WILDFIRE SAFETY PLAN, supra note 128, at 63; see Gregory, supra note
146; see also Worth & Pinchin, supra note 141.
288. SED 2019 PSPS REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see also Gavin Bade, In a first, PG&E
cuts power to 60,000 to prevent wildfires during wind storm, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/in-a-first-pge-cuts-power-to-60000-to-prevent-wildfiresduring-wind-stor/539680/.
289. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 399.2 (2001).
290. Id.
291. See CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 399, 399.2 (2001). CPUC Takes Action, supra note
23, at 2.
292. Cagle, supra note 8.
293. Trageser, supra note 98.
294. Id.
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miles of electric transmission lines, and 25,500 miles of distribution lines
located in High Fire-Threat Districts; for 2021, the utility is limiting its
hardening to 180 miles of overhead facilities in higher risk areas.295
This means PG&E intends to target a small portion of its vast
infrastructure located in high-fire risk areas over the course of a decade,
despite remaining largely unaware of the age, composition, or degree of
wear of much of its electrical system.296 Utility company failures to
adequately invest in their own electrical infrastructure threaten reliable
delivery of power and endanger public safety by exposing consumers to
dangerous infrastructure and potential wildfires.297 The CPUC’s
primary obligation rests with protecting the public safety, and to advance
this duty requires CPUC evaluation into utility infrastructure
investments—an integral factor currently missing from CPUC
reasonableness review standards.
V. CONCLUSION
De-energization serves as a vital tool of last resort when
emergencies necessitate immediate power shutoffs. Yet, IOU deenergization authority carries an accompanying danger of utility abuse.
For PG&E, de-energization entices sidestepping its legal obligations to
reasonably invest in its workforce and electrical infrastructure—
investments necessary for providing safe and reliable power to
customers and the public.
The State of California charges the California Public Utilities
Commission with regulating all public utilities operating within its
jurisdiction, to execute orders, and to examine IOU compliance with
state law. To remain consistent with its statutory obligation the CPUC
must inquire into whether IOUs like PG&E are fulfilling their
infrastructure investments, providing safe reliable power, and narrowly
applying de-energization as the tool of last resort. The CPUC stands
empowered to incorporate infrastructure investments as a critical factor
in its de-energization review, and in its decision to authorize a Safety

295. UPDATED 2020 WMP REPORT, supra note 132, at 7; see also PG&E 2021 WMP
REPORT, supra note 132, at 558.
296. Id. See also CAMP FIRE REPORT, supra note 25, at 66 n.124 (acknowledging PG&E
has not historically kept records of the age or material composition of its suspension hooks,
despite suspension hooks being a common hardware in many of its transmission and
distribution facilities—facilities inclusive of over 50,000 steel transmission structures,
100,000 non-steel transmission structures, and over two million distribution poles).
297. See Van Derbeken, supra note 244 (comments by Mark Toney—the head of
ratepayer advocacy group TURN—on the CPUC consideration of withholding PG&E Safety
Certification) (“For really the first time we are seeing the CPUC not simply rubber stamp the
safety certification, and that is progress.”).
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Certificate allowing utility access to the wildfire fund. With shelter-inplace orders, global pandemic, and a looming 2021 wildfire season,
public safety demands bold CPUC action to hold utilities responsible for
upgrading their electrical infrastructure.

